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Introduction: Ronald H. Coase and the Law 
In The Problem of Social Cost, economist Ronald H. Coase 
criticized what he called the traditional “economic analysis” of legal 
questions as embodied in the work of Arthur C. Pigou, another 
economist.1 Thirty years later, Coase received the Nobel Prize in 
Economics “for his discovery and clarification of the significance of 
transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and 
functioning of the economy.”2 The Nobel Committee stated that 
Coase’s “achievements have provided legal science . . . with powerful 
impulses and are therefore also highly significant in an interdisciplinary 
context” and that “Coase’s theories are among the most dynamic forces 
behind research in . . . jurisprudence.”3  
The Committee singled out Coase’s work in The Problem of 
Social Cost as a “major study” in which  
Coase found that courts probably try to distribute . . . rights 
among the parties so as to realize the solution which would have 
 
1. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960). 
2. Press Release, Royal Swedish Acad. of Sciences, Royal Swedish Acad. of 
Sciences Awards the Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in 
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 1991, to Professor 
Ronald Coase, Univ. of Chi. (Oct. 15, 1991) (on file with author). The 
Nobel Committee describes Coase’s discovery as follows:  
[Coase] postulated that if a property right is well defined, if it 
can be transferred, and if the transaction costs in an agreement 
which transfers the right from one holder to another are zero, 
then the use of resources does not depend on whether the right 
was initially allotted to one party or the other (except for the 
difference which can arise if the distribution of wealth between 
the two parties is affected). If the initial holding entailed an 
unfavorable total result, the better result would be brought 
about spontaneously through a voluntary contract, as it can be 
executed at no cost and both parties gain from it. In other 
words, all legislation which deals with granting rights to 
individuals would be meaningless in terms of the use of 
resources; parties would “agree themselves around” every given 
distribution of rights if it is to their mutual advantage. Thus, a 
large amount of legislation would serve no material purpose if 
transaction costs are zero. . . . This led Coase to conclude that it 
is the fact that transaction costs are never zero which indeed 
explains the institutional structure of the economy, including 
variations in contract forms and many kinds of legislation. Or, 
more exactly, the institutional structure of the economy may be 
explained by the relative costs of different institutional 
arrangements, combined with parties’ efforts to keep total costs 
at a minimum. 
Id. 
3. Id. 
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been the outcome of an agreement, if such an agreement had 
been possible. The underlying idea is that this is a natural and 
rational way for a court to reason if it is more intent on setting 
a precedent to generate expedient incentives for the future than 
solving a particular dispute. This means that common pleas 
courts serve as an extension of the market mechanism to areas 
where it cannot function due to transaction costs. This 
hypothesis has become immensely important because, along 
with the general formulation in terms of rights or property 
rights, it has become the impetus for developing the new 
discipline of “law and economics” and . . . for renewal of many 
aspects of legal science.4 
Indeed, The Problem of Social Cost is one of the most frequently 
cited articles in law reviews.5 
Coase offers an economic analysis that explains the results of 
three important English legal developments: the institution of 
building regulation in London, the establishment of legal protection 
for easements and profits, and the establishment of legal protection 
from interference with quiet enjoyment. These developments provide a 
suitable context for illustrating and demonstrating his work. All three 
protect property from unwanted interferences—in legal parlance, from 
nuisances. They are especially appropriate for examination because 
the “analytics of the classic nuisance dispute have been the 
touchstone of economic theories of the law,” and especially the 
theories of Coase.6 
Coase’s work justifies the early English nuisance decisions by 
arguing that the law imposes liability for activities that impose net 
social costs if and only if the market and firms are unable to correct 
the resulting inefficiency because of transaction costs.7 Yet, there are 
 
4. Id. 
5. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Sonia Lahr-Pastor, Measuring Coase’s 
Influence, 54 J.L. & Econ. S383, S383 (2011) (“‘The Problem of Social 
Cost’ (1960) . . . [is] among the most cited articles in both economics 
and law and continue[s] to be widely cited.”). Not coincidentally, the 
statement that Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost is the most cited 
work in law reviews is probably the most frequent footnote. 
6. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 
90 Va. L. Rev. 965, 966 (2004). 
7. This Note is unconcerned with the part of Coase’s work analyzing the 
behavior of individuals in a hypothetical world of no transaction costs 
and the so-called Coase Theorem’s predictions of this behavior. Rather, 
this Note concerns Coase’s economic analysis of the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for government action, an analysis at the core of his 
work in The Problem of Social Cost. Coase has always acknowledged 
the existence of transaction costs in the real world. See Robert C. 
Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against “Coaseanism,” 99 YALE L.J. 
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some actions that impose net social costs without subjecting the actor 
to common law liability. Two English legal decisions in particular 
established absolute exceptions to the nuisance cause of action and 
are counterexamples that disprove Coase’s economic analysis of the 
common law. In 1410, Hamlyn v. More established the little-discussed 
competitive nuisance exception still followed today in England and 
the United States, and in 1596, Boulston v. Hardy established the 
wild-animal nuisance exception that Coase explicitly acknowledged to 
run counter to his economic analysis of the common law in The 
Problem of Social Cost.8 
The common law nuisance exceptions established in Hamlyn v. More 
and Boulston v. Hardy show that Coase’s economic analysis is unsound 
because it yields false positives by justifying recognition of causes of 
action in spite of insufficient sympathy with the plight of potential 
plaintiffs and the perceived incapacity of legal intervention to make a 
difference.9 Moreover, the failure of Coase’s economic analysis to account 
for sympathy and capacity suggests it may also be incomplete.10  
If Coase’s economic analysis of the common law is neither sound 
nor complete—if it does not offer either the necessary or sufficient 
conditions for government action—his transaction-cost justification 
for government action should be rejected. 
I. Three Important English Legal Developments 
That Protect Property Use from Interference 
Coase’s famous article focuses on regulations designed to protect 
property use from interference. The importance of these regulations 
and the role of government as a coordinator of land use are frequently 
disparaged, in no small part thanks to Coase and his Nobel-winning 
economic analysis of common law nuisance cases in The Problem of 
Social Cost.11 Robert Ellickson offers a typical example: 
In the nineteenth century several million people in the Midwest 
coordinated their efforts and built the city of Chicago. No one 
 
611, 612–13 (1989) (debunking the “[c]ardboard” conception of Coase as 
believing that the Coase Theorem operates in the real world). 
8. See infra Part III.A–B. 
9. To yield false positives is to be unsound. A vending machine that 
accepts counterfeit notes is unsound. A theory is unsound if it does not 
offer a sufficient condition for the occurrence of the result to be 
explained. Unsoundness is demonstrated in Parts III and IV.  
10. To yield false negatives is to be incomplete. A vending machine that 
rejects genuine notes is incomplete. A theory is incomplete if it does not 
offer a necessary condition for the occurrence of the result to be 
explained. Incompleteness is suggested in Part IV.C. 
11. See infra Part II.A. 
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supervised this achievement and no single actor had more than 
a small part in it. Indeed, that Chicago’s growth was largely 
undirected likely helped it develop so quickly.12 
Perhaps the city of Chicago was built without extensive regulation 
and governmental land use coordination, but Ellickson’s flippancy is 
misplaced. Today, Chicago is known as the Second City because its 
first iteration, built in the nineteenth century, burned to the ground.13 
Moreover, the builders of the first and second Chicagos could rely on 
the land use patterns and conflict-resolution norms pioneered by the 
builders of the city of London. And, like the nineteenth-century 
builders of Chicago, the eleventh- and twelfth-century builders of 
London watched the city burn to the ground—frequently.14  
 
12. Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law 5 (1991). 
13. Elizabeth Canning Blackwell, Frommer’s Irreverent Guide to 
Chicago 5 (6th ed. 2007); but see Reid Badger, The Great 
American Fair 39 (1979) (presumably referring to New York as the 
first city and observing that, after the Great Fire of 1871, residents of 
Chicago began referring to the rebuilt city as the “second city”). 
William J. Novak refers to the constant threat of fire as the “most 
revealing of the underlying assumptions of nineteenth-century American 
governance.” William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare 53 (1996). 
Novak disputes claims of nineteenth-century American “statelessness,” 
such as Ellickson’s account of undirected development of cities, by 
pointing out that the threat of fire in fact was “met with immediate 
state action that was restrictive, forceful, and anything but voluntary.” 
Id. at 56.  
Ellickson recently addressed the fire that destroyed Chicago as well 
as several other great fires and disasters in his analysis of urban street 
layouts. Robert C. Ellickson, The Law and Economics of Street Layouts: 
How a Grid Pattern Benefits a Downtown, 64 Ala. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming Jan. 2012). Ellickson demonstrates that many cities do not 
use disasters as an opportunity to reshape downtown grids. Id. He 
argues that the absence of post-disaster grid transformation speeds 
recovery. Id. His argument on this point is similar to his argument in 
Order Without Law that inaction by city government is an urban 
stimulant. Id. While Elllickson points to several mechanisms underlying 
the inaction-stimulant theory, it seems largely based on his distrust of 
the men and women who serve as local government officials: 
[T]he outcomes that result from planning may be inferior to 
those that would have otherwise resulted [without planning]. 
Like all humans, planners have limited cognitive capacities, may 
have worse information than people on the ground, and may be 
tempted to pursue self-interested ends. 
Id. (manuscript at 52). 
14. See London Assize of Nuisance 1301–1431, at ix (Helena M. Chew 
& William Kellaway eds., 1973) (“In a period of less than one hundred 
and fifty years there were, perhaps, as many as five major 
conflagrations.”). 
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To stop their city from burning down every thirty years, the 
thirteenth-century rebuilders of London instituted the Assisa de 
Edificiis, a regulation mandating the use of stone in construction.15 
The Assisa de Edificiis provided both a mechanism for sharing the 
cost of expensive stone construction—the party wall—and a 
mechanism for resolving the conflicts between neighbors fueled by 
their resulting proximity—the formal assize procedure.16 
The institution of the Assisa de Edificiis is one of three 
monumental English legal developments that afforded property users 
protection from interference. Around the time of the Assisa de 
Edificiis, new patterns of land use in rural areas created overlapping 
rights in land through division of ownership in the form of easements 
and profits. This overlap also created conflicts that required 
resolution. In response, the common law recognized a new cause of 
action to protect easements and profits from interference and 
disruption—the early assize of nuisance.17 The protection afforded by 
the early assize of nuisance soon evolved into a broader cause of 
action for resolving any dispute over land use interference—the 
modified assize of nuisance.18  
Taken together, these three English legal developments that 
protect property use from interference—institution of the Assisa de 
Edificiis, recognition of the early assize of nuisance, and recognition of 
the modified assize of nuisance—provide an appropriate context for 
evaluating and understanding Coase’s economic analysis of the 
common law in The Problem of Social Cost. Coase’s economic 
analysis of transaction costs explains and justifies each of these legal 
decisions. This apparent analytical power is at the heart of the 
popularity of Coase’s economic analysis of the common law in legal 
scholarship. Yet, as Parts III and IV will demonstrate, two English 
legal decisions that established absolute exceptions to the nuisance 
cause of action reveal that Coase’s economic analysis is analytically 
weak and therefore worthy of rejection by legal scholars. But first, the 
good news for Coase. 
A. Preventing Hazard: The Assisa de Edificiis 
In response to “as many as five major conflagrations,” the city of 
London instituted the Assisa de Edificiis (hereafter Assisa) “for 
settling disputes between neighbours concerning boundaries and other 
matters, and for encouraging the use of stone in building.”19 Reducing  
15. Id. at ix–xi. 
16. Id.; see also infra Part I.A. 
17. See infra Part I.B. 
18. See infra Part I.C. It is this cause of action that Coase analyzes in The 
Problem of Social Cost. See infra Part II.A. 
19. London Assize of Nuisance 1301–1431, supra note 14, at ix. 
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the frequency and spread of fires required the use of stone in building, 
and the expense of stone in turn necessitated the use of a single wall 
shared by two adjacent buildings, called a party wall.20 As adjacent 
buildings were not usually built at the same time or by the same 
builder, party walls were designed to be built into by the neighbor at 
a later date, with half of the stone wall’s three-foot width on each side 
of the property line.21 The Assisa required the owners of neighboring 
parcels to split the cost of the party wall—even owners who did not 
yet plan to or would not ever build into the wall.22  
This posed a problem if the owner of an adjacent parcel was 
unable to pay the required share when the other owner wanted to 
build. In a brilliant civic compromise that resembles a mix of adverse 
possession and eminent domain, the Assisa provided that if a 
neighbor was unable or unwilling to pay her share, the entire three-
foot width of the wall would be built on the non-paying neighbor’s 
land and the property line would shift one-and-a-half feet to the 
center of the wall.23 
These wall-sharing regulations pushed neighbors closer together. 
Building stone walls without splitting the cost with others was not 
only expensive, but a property owner who built inside the property 
line would also still have to contribute either money or land for the 
construction of a party wall on the property line upon the demand of 
a neighbor. Accordingly, it is unsurprising that building up to the 
property line quickly became the norm. 
This proximity in turn increased the probability and frequency of 
conflict between neighbors. To put one common conflict delicately, 
there was no indoor plumbing in early London and little room for 
outdoor privies, and so human waste was often eliminated indoors and 
subsequently defenestrated.24 This practice was less problematic when 
there were land buffers between neighbors, but the new building 
arrangements meant that this filth tended onto—or even into—the 
neighbor’s dwelling. Sewage was not only a threat from above. 
Improper maintenance of indoor privies’ cess pits resulted in seepage 
 
20. Id. at x; Paul Chynoweth, The Party Wall Casebook 3 (2003). 
21. London Assize of Nuisance 1301–1431, supra note 14, at x. 
22. Id. at xx–xxi. 
23. See id. (“[I]f one party could not or would not build jointly with the 
other, he was to give 3 ft. of his land and the other was to build at his 
own expense and the wall so built was to be shared equally between 
them.”). 
24. Id. at xxv. Another frequent dumping site was, of course, any moving 
body of water, so much so that the bodies would occasionally cease 
moving. Bill Bryson, At Home 357–59 (2010). 
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across the property line.25 Other conflicts arose over the flow of water, 
stench, and noise. The Assisa offered much needed “elaborate 
regulations for the settlement of [these] disputes between neighbours, 
concerning walls, gutters, windows, privies and paving.”26  
The Assisa provided that upon the complaint of a land owner, a 
formal assize consisting of twelve elected aldermen and the mayor 
would come to the site of the dispute, hear the land owner’s 
complaint, view the premises, and then issue an order resolving the 
conflict.27 In a typical case, a neighbor “complains that the cess-pit of 
the privy” of his neighbor “adjoins so closely his stone wall that the 
sewage penetrates his cellar . . . . [T]he assize comes upon the land” 
and “it is adjudged” by the assize “that within 40 days” the neighbor 
must move his “cess-pit 2 ½ ft.” away from the wall.28  
In this way, the Assisa’s institution of the assize procedure 
protected land users in London from interference. But this protection 
did not extend outside the city. Protection of land users throughout 
the entire kingdom developed not through legislation, as was the case 
with the Assisa, but through common law recognition of causes of 
action in the royal courts for interference with land use. This 
development of the modern cause of action for nuisance proceeded in 
two stages. 
B. Facilitating Division: The Early Assize of Nuisance 
The earliest recorded form of the cause of action for nuisance 
protected the use of land not owned by the user in fee simple but in 
which the user held a lesser interest in the form of an easement or 
profit. Easements and profits are rights to use land owned by others, 
such as rights of way and rights to take timber or fish.29 This 
seemingly humble beginning for the nuisance cause of action was 
actually quite illustrious, because easements and profits were once 
vitally important in facilitating increased division of land ownership 
in England into smaller parcels. Before turning to the common law 
recognition of protection for easement and profit holders, it is helpful 
to understand the important role easements and profits once played in 
permitting the beneficial division of land ownership amongst 
 
25. Indoor privies and cess pits had to be emptied, a job not only unpleasant 
but dangerous as well because “[w]orkers ran the risk of asphyxiation and 
even of explosions, since they worked by the light of a lantern in 
powerfully gaseous environments.” BRYSON, supra note 24, at 356. 
26. London Assize of Nuisance 1301–1431, supra note 14, at xx. 
27. Id. at xiii–xviii, xxv. 
28. Id. at 1. 
29. See 3 Catherine Palo, Tiffany Real Property § 756 (3d ed. Supp. 
2011) (easements); id. § 839 (profits). 
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concurrent users and reducing the need for full ownership of large 
parcels of land. 30  
A miller must obtain full ownership of the parcel of land on which 
the mill will sit because the constant physical presence of the mill 
precludes use by others. If this property is not immediately adjacent 
to a public road,31 the miller must also obtain a path for her 
customers to access the mill or face liability for causing customers to 
trespass to get to the mill.32 But the miller does not need the right to 
exclude others from using this path in ways that do not interfere with 
customers’ ability to access the mill. Thus, the miller need not obtain 
full ownership of the path—she need only seek a nonexclusive right of 
way (the right to have customers occasionally use the path) over land 
owned in fee simple and used concurrently by others. A partial 
interest providing a nonexclusive right of use for traveling is an 
easement.  
Similar in origin and function to an easement, a profit is a partial 
interest in land providing a nonexclusive right of use for periodically 
harvesting timber, crops, or fish. Markets were expensive and difficult 
 
30. Full ownership in this context means the right of exclusive use, 
including an estate for a term, not necessarily ownership in fee simple. 
31. The placement of watermills is constrained by the need for running 
water. This constraint is substantial and in many places would make 
building next to a public road difficult or impossible. Indeed, as a 
graduate student touring historic engineering sites in France, Jim 
Edmonson, Chief Curator of the Dittrick Medical History Center at 
Case Western Reserve University, was guided by a fellow graduate 
student to the site of an ancient mill solely on the basis of the city’s 
topography, as water must run downhill. E-mail from Jim Edmonson, 
Chief Curator, Dittrick Med. History Ctr., Case W. Reserve Univ., to 
author (Mar. 15, 2012, 04:16 EDT) (on file with author). As he relates, 
[W]e were looking for the Forges de Buffon in Burgundy, near 
the town of Montbard. Signage was poor and we were pretty 
lost until one of the [other graduate] students, Duncan Hay, said 
that he could probably figure out the location of the forges by 
analyzing the topography and waterways, because such water-
powered mills could only be situated in areas where there were 
significant waterfalls. Sure enough, we looked at the lay of the 
land and it led us to the probable site—eh voila! there was the 
Forges de Buffon. 
Id. 
32. In an early reported nuisance case, an action lay against a mill for 
failing to obtain land for such a path because customer traffic to and 
from the mill created a path across an adjacent meadow owned by 
another. S.F.C. Milsom, Introduction to Novae Narrationes, at xcviii 
(Elsie Shanks & S.F.C. Milsom eds., 1963). In the suit, the plaintiff 
“[had] a hay meadow adjoining the mill” erected by the defendant and a 
path had been worn “across this meadow by reason of this mill, where 
there never was a path before.” Id. at B 147. 
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to finance for a long time following the Norman Conquest.33 Even 
when markets were nearby, they were usually open only one day a 
week.34 In this pre-Walmart economy, land owners needed access to 
timber, grains, and fish. Thus, each parcel of land had to contain 
woods, fields, and rivers. Accordingly, estates had to be large enough 
to contain the resources necessary for daily sustenance. Profits offered 
an alternative to large estates that afforded land owners access to 
timber, crops, and fish. One individual could own land without woods 
and another individual could own land without rivers, and each could 
make up the deficiency by obtaining a profit from the other. Thus, 
profits enabled land owners to decrease the size of their estates, generally 
increasing the potential number of individual estates in England. 
Easements and profits work only if they can be enforced and are 
not easily defeasible. The miller must be able to rely on the continued 
right of way after the construction of the mill. The profit holder must 
be able to rely on the continued right to extract after the 
consideration has been paid. This reliance would not be possible if the 
rights were enforceable only against the party that granted them. 
Land owner A could give a right of way to B and subsequently 
convey the land in fee simple to C, who might build a wall that would 
prevent B from using the right of way, and B would have no 
remedy.35 Without a mechanism for enforcement against subsequent 
owners, no potential partial user of land could rely on its continued use. 
Accordingly, holders of easements and profits needed a cause of 
action affording broader protection of their rights than was offered by 
the previously recognized cause of action against interfering with 
grantors of easements and profits.36 The common law courts provided 
 
33. In order to open a market, one had to obtain permission from the crown 
and obtain a charter, presumably for a fee. And even if one were able to 
open a market, one ran the risk that other nearby markets would draw 
away business or bring an action for competitive nuisance. See 
discussion infra Part III.A. 
34. Markets were designated by the particular day of the week on which 
they were open. See James Masschaele, Market Rights in Thirteenth-
Century England, 107 Eng. Hist. Rev. 78, 83 (1992) (recounting 
conflict between two nearby “Tuesday” markets); id. at 85 (describing a 
grant of a “Wednesday” market). 
35. Had C built a wall on land B owned in full, B would have the remedy of 
ejectment, but this remedy does not exist for nonowners. Because C has 
not breached any agreement with B, B has no remedy in contract. See, 
e.g., City of Cincinnati v. White’s Lessee, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 431, 441 
(1832) (“[T]he plaintiff must have, not only the legal title, but a clear 
present right to the possession of the premises; or he cannot recover in 
an action of ejectment.”). 
36. Glanvill provides a “writ for having easements in free tenements” 
against the grantor of an easement or profit. Ranulf de Glanvill, 
Tractatus de Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni Anglie qui 
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this needed protection in the form of the early assize of nuisance, first 
recognized by Glanvill in the twelfth century as a form of the assize 
of novel disseisin37 and later recognized by Bracton in the thirteenth 
century as the assize of nuisance.38 The early assize of nuisance 
permitted an easement or profit holder to bring suit against a non-
grantor whose activities disrupted enjoyment of the easement or profit.39 
C. Preventing Interference: The Modified Assize of Nuisance 
The early assize of nuisance only lay against activities occurring 
on the land of others if those activities interfered with an easement or 
a profit, but that constraint was soon left behind. In its place came 
the more expansive action for any activity that frustrated a plaintiff’s 
use and enjoyment of any land in which the plaintiff held an 
interest.40 This included for the first time activities interfering with 
 
Glanvilla Vocatur bk. XII, c. 14 (G.D.G. Hall ed. & trans., Oxford 
Univ. Press 1965) (ca. 1187–1189) [hereinafter Glanvill]. 
37.  Id. bk. XIII, c. 33; see also id. c. 35 (“N. has complained . . . that R. 
unjustly and without a judgment has raised up (or knocked down) a 
bank in such-and-such a vill . . . to the nuisance of N.’s free tenement in 
the same vill.”). 
38. Henrici de Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae f. 
233 (Samuel E. Thorne ed. & trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1977) (ca. 
1245–1257) [hereinafter Bracton] (“[O]ne has complained to us that 
such a one wrongfully and without judgment constructed a certain wall 
(‘bank,’ ‘hedge,’ ‘palisade,’ ‘house,’ ‘gate,’ ‘bridge,’ ‘pond,’ ‘sluice,’ 
‘weir,’ ‘mill’ [or] ‘sheep fold’) in such a vill to the nuisance of his free 
tenement in the same vill . . . .”). 
39. In one example, Bracton provides that the owner of a profit permitting 
the use of land for pasturing livestock 
is entitled to free ingress and egress. If he whose land it is does 
something to his means of ingress, so that he can hardly enter at 
all, or only with greater inconvenience, as where he builds a 
wall, a bank or a hedge, he commits a wrongful nuisance.  
Id. f. 231b. Further, as to easements, Bracton provided for a like result 
“if the right of going over another’s land is granted and the road is 
obstructed in some way or narrowed, so that it may not be traversed at 
all, or only with difficulty.” Id. 
40. Some have interpreted the early assize of nuisance recognized by 
Glanvill as affording this protection all along. See 2 Frederick 
Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, The History of 
English Law 53 (2d reissued ed. 1968) (“To meet that troubling of 
possession which is caused by nuisances as distinguished from trespasses, 
that is, by things that are erected, made, or done, not on the soil 
possessed by the complainant but on neighbouring soil, there has all 
along been an ‘assize of nuisance’ which is a supplement for the novel 
disseisin.” (citing Glanvill, supra note 36, bk. XIII, c. 34–36)). This 
stems from the language in two example writs following the general 
writ. Glanvill, supra note 36, bk. XIII, c. 35. The first concerned the 
raising of mill ponds: “N. has complained . . . that R. unjustly and 
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neighboring land owners. Thus, Bracton provided that a land owner 
may be forbidden by a court to  
do anything wrongfully in his own land by which his neighbour 
may be damaged, that is, that he not make a pond (or raise its 
level or lower it) lest by an overflow of water he flood his 
neighbour’s tenement, nor a house, bridge, pond, weir, sluice or 
mill by which his neighbour is wrongfully damaged.41  
This modified assize of nuisance effectively endowed land 
ownership with a broad and powerful right of quiet enjoyment.42  
Whether Bracton and the others who modified the early assize of 
nuisance intended this result for policy reasons or simply believed it 
followed logically from the early assize of nuisance is unclear. Some 
have argued that the law merely recognized a “natural right” 
associated with land ownership from time immemorial.43 It is also 
plausible that because the right of quiet enjoyment was formerly 
ensured by the relationship between adjoining tenants and their 
mutual lord—each tenant had a right against unreasonable 
interference from the lord—extension of the right of quiet enjoyment 
became necessary as freeholds grew increasingly prevalent. When 
neighboring land was owned by the lord, the lord had a seigniorial 
authority and responsibility to manage conflicts between adjacent 
 
without a judgment has raised the level of his mill pond in such-and-
such a vill . . . to the nuisance of N.’s free tenement in the same vill (or 
in another vill).” Id. bk. XIII, c. 36  (emphasis added)). The second 
concerned interference with rights of common pasture: “N. has 
complained . . . that R. unjustly and without a judgment has disseised 
him of his common pasture in such-and-such a vill which is appurtenant 
to his free tenement in the same vill (or in some other named vill).” Id. 
XIII, c. 37 (emphasis added)). Whether this language actually 
recognized actions for nuisance unrelated to the raising of mill ponds is 
unclear. When the broader right developed, it seems unlikely to have 
preceded or been concurrent with the initial use of the assize of novel 
disseisin for protection of easements and profits that provided the 
necessary precedent. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 821D cmt. a (1979) (simply observing that the “assize of nuisance also 
extended to interferences with easements and profits” without discussing 
whether this was a concurrent or precedent development).  
41. Bracton, supra note 38, f. 232b. Bracton’s reference to mill ponds is 
evidently a reference to Glanvill. See Glanvill, supra note 36, bk. XIII, 
c. 36. 
42. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D cmt. a (1979) (“[T]he 
assize of nuisance provided redress [for] . . . indirect damage to the land 
or an interference with its use and enjoyment . . . . [T]he assize of 
nuisance [was directed] to secure . . . free enjoyment.”). 
43. Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American 
Nuisance Law: 1850 to 1920, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1101, 1116–17 (1986). 
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parcels.44 Owners of neighboring freeholds had no such recourse if 
either owner held directly of the Crown. It thus became necessary to 
provide the coordination and conflict resolution, formerly provided by 
the lord, through direct actions between neighbors in the Crown (as 
opposed to seigniorial) courts. This modified form of the assize of 
nuisance eventually surpassed its predecessor in popularity and 
importance, and it comes down to us today as the modern cause of 
action for nuisance. This is the cause of action that Coase famously 
analyzed in The Problem of Social Cost.45 
II. Coase’s Economic Analysis of the Common Law  
Explains These Three English Nuisance Developments  
The common law developments to institute the Assisa de 
Edificiis, to recognize the early assize of nuisance, and to recognize 
the modified assize of nuisance seem self-explanatory. The Assisa 
helped regulate hazardous building conditions, the early assize of 
nuisance enabled the greater partition of land, and the modified assize 
of nuisance protected the quiet enjoyment of land from interference. 
But in 1960, Ronald H. Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost famously 
argued that the last of these three decisions—recognition of the 
modified assize of nuisance cause of action—and many other legal 
regimes are justified by a more subtle economic analysis. Coase’s 
theory, whatever its merit, does explain and predict each of the three 
common law decisions outlined in the previous Part. 
A. Coase’s Economic Analysis 
Coase framed his economic analysis of the common law as a 
criticism of the earlier work of Arthur C. Pigou. Coase recounted 
Pigou’s justification of government action, such as recognition of the 
nuisance cause of action, on the basis of a divergence between the net 
cost felt by a decision maker and the net cost felt by all members of 
society.46 This divergence is traditionally called an externality. An 
externality exists whenever a local decision has a nonlocal effect. 
Pigou noted that some externalities involve uncompensated benefits, 
 
44. See Glanvill, supra note 36, bk. IX, c. 4 (“The bond of trust arising 
from lordship and homage should be mutual, so that the lord owes as 
much to the man on account of lordship as the man owes to the lord on 
account of homage, save only reverence.”); id. bk. XII, c. 10 (providing 
a writ prohibiting a lord from “unjustly vexing” a tenant or “permitting 
him to be vexed”). The lord was also responsible for maintaining 
“reasonable boundaries” between tenants as they “ought to be and 
customarily are.” Id. bk. XII, c. 16. 
45. See infra Part II.A, D. 
46. Coase, supra note 1, at 28 (citing A.C. Pigou, The Economics of 
Welfare 183 (4th ed. 1932)). 
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such as the benefits provided by a lighthouse, and others involve 
uncompensated costs, such as the costs created by a foul-smelling pig 
sty.47 
Coase agreed that the problem is externalities but put it 
differently: Coase framed the issue as preventing activities that 
impose greater net social cost than net social gain.48 But he added 
that government need not and should not act to correct every 
externality because the market will minimize social costs through 
contracts or the development of firms.49 Coase hypothesized that, in 
some instances, those who generate positive externalities can negotiate 
for payment from those who benefit and that those who suffer from 
negative externalities can negotiate with those who cause them 
harm.50 He also hypothesized that, in some instances, a single entity 
will come to own the agents that cause and that are either benefited 
or harmed by externalities and will internally coordinate to resolve 
conflict. Coase theorized that market forces and firm formation will 
fail to minimize social costs only if transaction costs—the expense and 
difficulty of entering into contracts or creating firms—are 
prohibitively high.51  
47. Id. Coase excerpted Pigou’s statement that  
one person A, in the course of rendering some service, for which 
payment is made, to a second person B, incidentally also renders 
services or disservices to other persons (not producers of like 
services), of such a sort that payment cannot be exacted from 
the benefited parties or compensation enforced on behalf of the 
injured parties. 
Id. (quoting Pigou, supra note 46, at 183). 
48. Id. at 44. 
49. See id. at 15 (“It is always possible to modify by transactions on the 
market the initial legal delimitation of rights. . . . [I]f such market 
transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of rights will always take 
place if it would lead to an increase in the value of production.”). 
50. Coase assumed that courts will reliably enforce the resulting agreements. 
This assumption is frustrating because it presumes a particular 
government response in propounding a theory of the role of government 
but does not do so explicitly. No contract regarding land use is worth 
the paper it is written on unless the obligations run to subsequent 
owners or users of the land. Coase ignored the difficult issues involved in 
establishing the laws relating to such servitudes with his examples of 
ranchers contracting with farmers. The law has never withdrawn all 
supervision over the creation of running obligations. Coase did not 
discuss the economic issues relating to servitudes and whether they 
should run. Criticism of Coase must accordingly assume that in all 
instances these agreements would run. Perhaps this is just one form of a 
transaction cost, but it is distressing nonetheless for Coase to have 
theorized about basic governmental decision making while assuming 
that all governments enforce land use restrictions on subsequent assigns. 
51. Coase, supra note 1, at 15. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012 
Tragic Parlor Pigs and Comedic Rascally Rabbits 
569 
Coase asserted that, because “the governmental administrative 
machine . . . [can] be extremely costly[,] . . . direct governmental 
regulation will not necessarily give better results than leaving the 
problem to be solved by the market or the firm.”52 Therefore, he 
argued government should only intervene “on occasion,” and only if 
“governmental administrative regulation [would] lead to an 
improvement in economic efficiency” because “the costs of handling 
the problem through the market or the firm” are too high.53 Coase 
provided the example of a “smoke nuisance”—a factory emitting 
smoke to the disturbance of nearby residences—because “a large 
number of people are involved and . . . therefore the costs of handling 
the problem through the market or the firm may be high.”54  
B. Coase’s Analysis Explains the Assisa de Edificiis  
Building decisions in cities create externalities that the market 
and the firm do not solve because of transaction costs. Cities are 
densely populated and structured regions, and so city fires can take 
many lives and result in enormous economic damage. Firetraps thus 
pose disproportionately high risks beyond any potential private cost 
that is or could be imposed on the builder. An ideal illustration of the 
potential divergence between private and social costs resulting from 
decisions that cause or spread fires involves the infamous Chicago 
milkmaid who placed her lantern too close to a cow’s hooves.55 It 
would have been in all Chicagoans’ economic interest that the lantern 
be placed farther away (or that that milkmaid wait until daylight). 
But it was not possible for other property owners to negotiate with 
the milkmaid and get her to agree not to place the lantern where she 
did. Nor does it seem feasible for all property in the city to be owned 
by a firm that also employs all milkmaids in the city so that the firm 
could direct the socially optimal placement of the lantern. Under 
these circumstances, it is evident that without government action 
“[o]ne person’s carelessness or folly could put the public safety and 
common welfare at immediate and severe risk.”56  
52. Id. at 18. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. In the infamous initial report, the Chicago Evening Journal stated that 
“[t]he fire broke out on the corner of DeKoven and Twelfth streets, at 
about 9 o’clock on Sunday evening, being caused by a cow kicking over 
a lamp in a stable in which a woman was milking.” The Great Calamity 
of the Age! Chicago in Ashes!!, Chi. Evening J., Oct. 9, 1871. While 
the Great Chicago Fire of 1871 “did start in Mrs. O’Leary’s barn,” 
O’Leary and others denied that “Mrs. O’Leary, her cow, and her 
lantern” were to blame. Richard F. Bales, The Great Chicago 
Fire and the Myth of Mrs. O’Leary’s Cow 53 (2002). 
56. Novak, supra note 13, at 55. 
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The choice of whether to use stone buildings similarly involves the 
decision to bestow either an uncompensated benefit or cost on 
others—that is, to create either a positive or negative externality. 
Using stone reduces the risk of fire spreading and benefits other 
property owners. Using flammable materials increases the risk of fire 
spreading and imposes a cost on other property owners. And, like the 
decision of the milkmaid, neither the market nor the firm could be 
expected to ensure that stone was used. Thus, the Assisa’s 
requirement of stone use is justified by Coase’s economic analysis.  
C. Coase’s Analysis Explains the Early Assize of Nuisance 
Easements and profits also create the potential for externalities. 
Easements and profits always result in divided use of land. An 
individual’s use of land concurrent with others’ use has obvious 
potential to affect the other users. An individual’s decision to engage 
in an activity that interferes with the concurrent use of the land by 
an easement or profit holder poses an uncompensated-for cost on the 
easement or profit holder. Excessive transaction costs result from the 
bilateral monopoly problem, in which two parties must deal with one 
another because “if neither party has good alternatives to dealing 
with the other, transaction costs may be quite high.”57 Since the 
owner of the easement or profit has no alternative to negotiating with 
the individual whose use is interfering with the easement or profit, the 
common law’s decision to impose liability on interferers with 
easements and profits is justified by transaction costs created by a 
bilateral monopoly problem.  
D. Coase’s Analysis Explains the Modified Assize of Nuisance 
Land owners have the power to decide between using land in 
ways that do or do not create harmful impacts on the use and 
enjoyment of neighboring land. This creates the possibility of 
uncompensated-for harms. In The Problem of Social Cost, Coase 
 
57. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law 60 (6th ed. 
2003). Posner cited settlement negotiation as a typical example of the 
bilateral monopoly problem: 
Because the plaintiff can settle only with the defendant, and the 
defendant only with the plaintiff, there is a range of prices 
within which each party will prefer settlement to the more 
costly alternative of litigation. Ascertaining this range may be 
costly, and the parties may consume much time and resources in 
bargaining within the range. Indeed, each party may be so 
determined to engross the greater part of the potential profits 
from the transaction that they never succeed in coming to 
terms. 
Id. at 60–61. He noted that this “problem in strategic behavior” 
implicates game theory. Id. at 61. 
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argued that, in some cases of nuisance, harm is caused to a neighbor 
because it is economically efficient. He explained that it is therefore 
only appropriate to impose liability if the decision causing the 
nuisance results in an economic inefficiency that remains uncorrected 
because of transaction costs.58 According to Coase’s analysis, this 
explains the balancing approach used in nuisance cases.59 While the 
proper boundaries under Coase’s approach are uncertain, he explicitly 
asserted that, at least in the case of a smoke nuisance, the cause of 
action is justified because of the “large number of people” involved 
and the high “costs of handling the problem through the market or 
the firm.”60 
III. Coase’s Economic Analysis of the Common Law 
Disagrees with Two Important Nuisance Exceptions 
As the previous Part demonstrates, Coase argued that the law 
should impose liability for activities that create net social costs. Yet 
some actions impose net social costs without subjecting the actor to 
common law liability. Two decisions in particular are counterexamples 
that disprove Coase’s economic analysis of the common law. The early 
common law courts recognized several causes of action for harm 
caused by competition. According to Coase’s analysis, this is a sound 
result. But the common law reversed course in 1410 in Hamlyn v. 
More.61 Coase’s economic analysis does not provide justification. Nor 
does his analysis justify the result in Boulston v. Hardy, a common 
law decision in 1596 holding that land owners are never liable for 
harms to neighbors caused by wild animals.62 
 
58. Coase, supra note 1, at 18. 
59. See Smith, supra note 6, at 967 (According to Coase’s view of the 
balancing approach, “when conflicts between actors and their activities 
arise, a court’s job . . . is to decide which use shall prevail. The hallmark 
of nuisance law then becomes reasonableness, where each use must be 
justified in terms of a grand cost-benefit analysis.”). 
60. Coase, supra note 1, at 18. 
61. Y.B. 11 Hen. 4, fol. 47, Hil., pl. 21 (1410) (Eng.); John Baker, Baker 
and Milsom: Sources of English Legal History 671 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2d ed. 2010) (1986) [hereinafter Baker & Milsom]. The Baker & 
Milsom translation of the report from the original middle French is 
provided below at note 72 for the reader’s convenience, as it is quite 
short and is not widely available. 
62. Boulston v. Hardy, (1596) 77 Eng. Rep. 216 (K.B.); Bowlston v. Hardy, 
(1596) 78 Eng. Rep. 794 (K.B.) (reported with a different spelling of 
Boulston). There is some uncertainty over the precise date of this case. 
The former report cites the case as occurring in the Michealmas 
(“Mich.” in the reporter) term (October to December) in the thirty-
ninth and fortieth year of the reign of Elizabeth (1596 and 1597), while 
the latter report cites the case as occurring in the Hillary term (January 
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A. Competitive Nuisance: Hamlyn v. More 
The common law courts recognized causes of action for harm 
caused by economic rivals before the decision in Hamlyn v. More. The 
operator of a mill, oven, or other capital project could bring an action 
on the case against economic rivals once the operator gained 
prescriptive rights against local inhabitants forcing them to use the 
mill or other capital project.63 The underlying quasi servitude on 
nearby land permitted the operator to bring an action to compel 
former customers to use the operator’s mill, oven, or other capital 
project instead of one operated by a rival, provided the operator could 
show that the local inhabitants had used the operator’s facility since 
time immemorial.64 The action on the case lay against the competitor 
who subsequently built a rival facility and caused these customers to 
cease doing business with the operator who held the prescriptive right 
to their patronage.65 Furthermore, the modified assize of nuisance was 
available to protect the operator of a market from those who might 
set up a rival market.66 All founders of markets had to obtain 
permission from the Crown, but even if a founder obtained the 
required charter to hold a market, the founder could be liable for 
setting up shop too close to a market held by another.67 
At first, recognition of these rights against economic rivals appears to 
involve the creation of a monopoly by the lord in order to reap benefits 
 
through April) of the thirty-ninth year of the reign of Elizabeth (1596). 
The full texts of both reports are provided below at note 85 for the 
reader’s convenience, as they are quite short and are not widely 
available. 
63. J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 449 (4th 
ed. 2007). 
64. 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *234–35; Novae Narrationes, 
supra note 32, at xc–xcvi; Baker, supra note 63, at 449. The operator 
of a mill would have to show that “the defendant and his ancestors had 
been compelled to grind their corn only at that mill” by “manorial 
custom” or “reserv[ation] on a freehold grant before 1290” when the 
statute of Quia Emptores made such reservations invalid. Id. Thus, the 
common law recognized a right against land owners that accrued outside 
of a personal relationship between the operator and the disloyal 
customer on the basis of custom. This is actually how Bracton justified 
the modified assize of nuisance—as a legally enforceable servitude 
created by custom. Bracton, supra note 38, f. 232. 
65. Baker, supra note 63, at 449. 
66. Id. at 431, 449. 
67. Masschaele, supra note 34, at 78–79. Operators of markets earned their 
return by charging tolls to those who sold their wares. The markets 
would attract many people to the area on the market day. By holding a 
market nearby, a second market holder could attract sellers with the 
prospect of nabbing customers traveling to visit the first market, a 
“medieval version[ ] of the corporate raider.” Id. 
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at the expense of tenants.68 Yet these rights were not only enforced in 
seigniorial courts by lords against tenants, but by independent operators 
in the royal courts as well.69 The Crown’s primary interest, as residual 
beneficiary of all production, was to see production maximized in order 
to generate higher revenues.70 Why, then, did the Crown courts enforce 
customary monopolies on behalf of the independent operators? These 
capital projects, especially mills, involved investments of significant 
magnitude, duration, and potential public benefit.71 The Crown courts 
evidently adopted policies that subsidized these considerable investments 
in order to increase their frequency. 
Then, in 1410, a schoolmaster in Gloucester brought suit against 
a rival schoolmaster whose recent competition drove down prices.72 
 
68. This was evidently the case on the continent, where seigniorial 
monopolies were “[o]ne of the most effective and most widely employed 
instruments of seigniorial control.” Jerome Blum, The End of the 
Old Order in Rural Europe 80 (1978) (citing Slavic, German, 
Romanian, Slovakian, Swiss, Bohemian, and Russian examples). 
69. See supra text accompanying notes 63–65 (discussing actions in royal 
courts). 
70. The Crown received income from production. If production increased, 
the Crown’s revenue increased. If production decreased, the Crown’s 
revenue decreased. It is therefore understandable that the policies of the 
Crown courts fell in line with the needs and desires of the Exchequer. 
71. See generally Marc Bloch, The Advent and Triumph of the Watermill, 
in Land and Work in Mediaeval Europe 136 (J.E. Anderson trans., 
1967); Richard Holt, The Mills of Medieval England (1988); 
Terry S. Reynolds, Stronger than a Hundred Men: A History 
of the Vertical Water Wheel (1983). 
72. Y.B. 11 Hen. 4, fol. 47, Hil., pl. 21 (1410) (Eng.); Baker & Milsom, 
supra note 61, at 671–72. The Hamlyn v. More decision is reproduced 
below, translated from the original middle French, as it is relatively 
short and not widely available: 
Two masters of a grammar school brought a writ of trespass 
against another master, and counted that, whereas the collation 
to the grammar school of Gloucester belonged from time 
immemorial to the prior of Llanthony near Gloucester, and the 
said prior had made collation to the said plaintiff to have the 
governance of the scholars and to teach the children and others: 
the defendant had set up school in the same town, as a result of 
which the plaintiffs—who had been accustomed to take 40d. or 
two shillings a quarter from each child—now took only 12d.; to 
their damage etc. ¶ Horton made a full defense. —Tildesley. 
Truly, his writ is invalid. ¶ Skrene. It is a good action on the 
case, and the plaintiffs have shown sufficient matter and have 
shown how they are damaged. ¶ Hankford.  Damnum may be 
absque injuria. For instance, if I have a mill and my neighbour 
sets up another mill, so that the profit from my mill is reduced, 
I shall have no action against him; and yet it is damaging to me. 
¶ Thirning [C.J.] agreed, and said that teaching children is a 
spiritual matter. And if a man retains a master in his own house 
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The plaintiff relied on the mill, oven, and market precedents.73 This 
reliance was not ill conceived, as a ferry owner had previously 
succeeded in suing the operator of a rival ferry under a similar 
 
to teach the children, although it would damage the common 
school-master of the town, I believe he shall not have an action. 
¶ Skrene. The masters of St Paul’s School claim that there shall 
be no other schoolmasters in the whole city of London except 
them. ¶ Then Horton demanded judgment whether the court 
would take cognisance. ¶ Skrene. You have passed that [step]. 
¶ Then Horton demurred, that the action was not maintainable. 
¶ Skrene. Since we will aver the prior’s title, as above, and that 
we are damaged by reason that he has drawn away our 
schoolboys—so that where we used to take 40d. or two shillings 
from each schoolboy for the quarter we now only take 12d.—we 
demand judgment, and pray our damages. ¶ Hill. In this there 
is lacking a foundation to support an action, because the 
plaintiffs have no estate, but only a ministry for the time being. 
And if another person, who is as well learned in the faculty as 
the plaintiffs are, comes to teach the children, this is a virtuous 
and charitable thing and [needful] to the people and for that he 
shall not be punished by our law. ¶ Thirning. This court 
cannot take cognisance whether the prior can have such 
collation of schools or not, because the teaching and instruction 
of children is a spiritual matter. It seems to me that, since the 
plaintiffs have claimed the school by the prior’s collation, and 
have based their action on that, which is accessory to and 
dependent on the prior’s title, which is the principal matter, and 
since that is a spiritual matter, this action cannot be tried in 
this court. ¶ Skrene. If a market is set up to the nuisance of my 
market, I shall have an assize of nuisance. And in a common 
case, if those coming to my market are hindered or beaten, 
whereby I lose my tolls, I shall have a good enough action on my 
case. Likewise here. ¶ Hankford. It is not comparable, because 
in your example you have a freehold and an inheritance in the 
market. Here, however, the plaintiffs have no estate in the 
schoolmastership, save for an uncertain time. And it would be 
against reason for a master to be prevented from holding school 
wherever he pleases, unless in the case of a university which has 
been incorporated, or schools founded in ancient times. In the 
case of  a mill, as I said before, if my neighbour sets up a mill, 
and others who used to grind at my mill go to the other mill, so 
that my toll is reduced, I shall not for this reason have an 
action. If, however, a miller prevents the water from running to 
my mill, or commits some nuisance of that kind, I shall have 
such action [against him] as the law gives. ¶ And the opinion of 
the court was that the writ did not lie. So it was awarded that 
they take nothing by their writ etc. 
Id. at 671–73 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted). The author 
also relied on an original translation by David Carper. 
73. Baker & Milsom, supra note 61, at 672 (“If a market is set up to the 
nuisance of my market, I shall have an assize of nuisance. . . . Likewise 
here.”). 
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theory.74  
The case could not be decided on the grounds that competition 
always benefits the public. The plaintiff presented instances in which 
the royal courts held that spurring investment was preferable to free 
competition, so at a minimum the court was familiar with exceptions 
to such a broad proposition.75 Further, the case precedes the laissez-
faire thesis that “[t]he natural operation of supply and demand in the 
free market . . . maximize[s] the satisfaction of all parties and 
establish[es] the common good” by three and a half centuries.76 
After much discussion, the court held that no cause of action 
lay.77 The court noted a distinction between “damnum” (damage) and 
“injuria” (injury) and observed that not all damages give rise to a 
legal remedy.78 The court concluded that to draw away customers 
from a mill would be damnum absque injuria, damage without injury, 
but to draw away water would cause injuria and give rise to a legal 
remedy.79 By rejecting the schoolmaster’s argument, Hamlyn v. More 
came to stand for the proposition that competition never gives rise to 
a cause of action for nuisance.  
 
74. See, e.g., S.F.C. Milsom, Introduction to Novae Narrationes, supra 
note 32, at lxxxviii–lxxxix (describing an “action . . . for nuisance” in 
1220 where “the owner of an established ferry complain[ed] of the 
opening of a new one”); 9 Curia Regis Rolls of the Reign of 
Henry III, Mich., 4-5 Henry III, Roll 77, 266 (1220); 10 Curia Regis 
Rolls of the Reign of Henry III, Mich., 5-6 Henry III, Roll 78, 
172. But it appears that the mill, oven, and other capital-project causes 
of action had fallen out of favor. The court stated that “if I have a mill 
and my neighbour sets up another mill, so that the profit from my mill 
is reduced, I shall have no action against him,” and, again, that “if my 
neighbour sets up a mill, and others who used to grind at my mill go to 
the other mill, so that my toll is reduced, I shall not for this reason have 
an action.” Baker & Milsom, supra note 61, at 671–72. Thus, the end 
of the economic rivalry causes of action may have preceded Hamlyn v. 
More, at least with respect to mills, by some years. Yet, the underlying 
action to force customers to use the ancient mill is included in 
Blackstone in 1768. Blackstone, supra note 64, at *234–35.   
75. See supra note 72. 
76. E.P. Thompson, The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the 
Eighteenth Century, 50 Past & Present 76, 90 (1971); see also id. at 
89 (“[The laissez-faire model of] political economy may, with 
convenience, be taken as that of Adam Smith, although The Wealth of 
Nations may be seen not only as a point of departure but also as a 
grand central terminus to which many important lines of discussion in 
the middle of the eighteenth century . . . all run.”). 
77. Baker & Milsom, supra note 61, at 671. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 672. 
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The resulting distinction is that, as famously noted in Keeble v. 
Hickeringill, “[i]f one man keeps a school in such a place, another may 
do so likewise in the same place, though he draw away the scholars 
from the other school: ’tis true this is damnum, but ’tis absque 
injuria; but he must not shoot guns at the scholars of the other school 
to fright them from coming there any more.”80 And from Pollock and 
Maitland: “If I erect a mill upon my land and so subtract customers 
from your mill, I do you damage, but no injury.”81 In other words, 
land use activities that reduce the economic return of neighboring 
land may be legally actionable as nuisances, but not if the activity is 
economic competition with the neighbor.82 
B. Wild Animal Nuisance: Boulston v. Hardy 
It is unclear whether Coase considered the common law exception 
for competitive nuisance, but he certainly considered another common 
law exception that undermines his economic analysis. In The Problem 
of Social Cost, Coase used Boulston v. Hardy as an example of the 
common law courts failing to recognize a cause of action when the 
courts should have according to his economic analysis.83 The plaintiff 
brought suit against his neighbor for digging and maintaining rabbit 
holes (coney-boroughs) on the neighbor’s property to such an extent 
that the plaintiff’s land became overrun with rabbits (coneys). The 
plaintiff had good reason to believe the action would lie. The modified 
assize of nuisance was by that time well established, with only the 
competition exception of Hamlyn v. More.84 The neighbor had 
 
80. Id. at 683; Keeble v. Hickeringhall, (1707) 91 Eng. Rep. 659 (Q.B.) (this 
report uses a nontraditional spelling); Lord Chief Justice Holt’s analogy 
to Hamlyn v. More in Keeble v. Hickeringill is separately reported based 
on his notes as follows: 
This is like the case of 11 H. 4, 47. One schoolmaster sets up a 
new school to the damage of an antient school, and thereby the 
scholars are allured from the old school to come to his new. (The 
action was held there not to lie.) But suppose Mr. Hickeringill 
should lie in the way with his guns, and fright the boys from 
going to school, and their parents would not let them go thither; 
sure that schoolmaster might have an action for the loss of his 
scholars.   
Keeble v. Hickeringill, (1707) 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Q.B.) 1128. 
81. Pollock & Maitland, supra note 40, at 534. 
82. This is a surprisingly little-mentioned result. See infra note 88. 
83. Coase, supra note 1, at 35–39 (extensively discussing the case). 
84. By this time, the action for private nuisance was procedurally more 
convenient than the modified assize of nuisance. See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 821D cmt. a (1979) (“Early in the fifteenth 
century, the assize of nuisance was replaced by an action on the case for 
nuisance that became the sole common law remedy.”). 
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engaged in an activity that brought harm to the plaintiff’s land, and 
that harm was not caused by economic rivalry so as to fall into the 
Hamlyn exception. But the court held that no cause of action for 
nuisance lay against the rabbit-hole-digging neighbor because the 
harm to the plaintiff flowed through the activities of wild animals.85 
 
85. Coase cited this report of the case:  
Between Boulston and Hardy it was adjudged in the Common 
Pleas, that if a man makes coney-boroughs in his own land, 
which increase in so great number that they destroy his 
neighbours’ land next adjoining, his neighbours cannot have an 
action on the case against him who makes the said coney-
boroughs; for so soon as the coneys come on his neighbour’s land 
he may kill them, for they are ferae naturae, and he who makes 
the coney-boroughs has no property in them, and he shall not be 
punished for the damage which the coneys do in which he has no 
property, and which the other may lawfully kill. 
Boulston v. Hardy, (1596) 77 Eng. Rep. 216 (C.P.) 216–17 (footnotes 
omitted), cited in Coase, supra note 1, at 37. Coneys are rabbits and 
coney-boroughs are rabbit holes. A more extensive report of Boulston, 
not cited by Coase, offers greater detail: 
Action upon the case. Whereas he was seised of certain lands in 
fee, and the defendant was seised of other lands adjoining, the 
defendant had made two coney-burrows in his lands adjoining, 
and had put conies in them, which increased to a great number, 
and went into the plaintiff’s land, and destroyed his corn, and 
made it barren, whereby he lost the profits of his land, and 
therefore brought the action. . . . [W]hether an action upon the 
case lay upon this matter ? was the only question. —Anderson. 
The action lies not; for although one hath conies in his land, he 
hath not any property in them, because they be ferae naturae. 
And to have an action against one for damage done by savage 
and wild creatures, wherein he hath not any interest, and they 
cannot be known whether they come out of his land, is 
unreasonable: he who hath the damage thereby may well kill 
them, and they may be said to be his conies when they are upon 
his lands. And if other men have other warrens adjoining, 
against whom shall the action be brought? Truly, against none 
of them. —Walmsley accord. For the property of the conies is 
not in any, nor can any man so keep them, but that they will 
break out of themselves; which is reason that none can have 
them in his own land, unless by grant from the King, or by 
prescription: if otherwise, he is punishable in a quo warranto; for 
the Queen hath the royalty in such things whereof none can 
have any property. This cause is not like to the cases put, on the 
other side, of erecting a lime-kiln, dye-house, or the like; for 
there the annoyance is by the act of the parties who make them; 
but it is not so here, for the conies of themselves went into the 
plaintiff’s land, and he might take them when they came upon 
his land, and make profit of them. None may erect a dove-house 
but he who is lord of a manor; and if any other private man 
erects it, it is punishable in the leet as a common nusance; but 
no action upon the case lies by any private man against him 
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The decision in Boulston meant that land uses causing wild animals 
to harm neighboring land were, like competition, to be considered 
damnum absque injuria under the common law. 
C. Coase’s Analysis Does Not Explain These Decisions 
Coase explicitly disagrees with the holding of Boulston v. Hardy, 
and his economic analysis justifies a result contrary to the holding of 
Hamlyn v. More. 
1. Disagreeing with Hamlyn v. More 
Coase’s analysis is not in accord with the holding in Hamlyn v.  
More—that land users are never liable for harms to neighboring land 
when those harms are caused by competition. The harm caused to the 
old school operator by the new school operator is an uncompensated-
for cost imposed on the old school operator. The large number of 
potential school operators would be too great for the old school 
operator to enter into noncompete agreements with all potential 
rivals, and this transaction cost eliminates the presumption that the 
market will achieve the economically efficient result.86 Therefore, 
Coase would have a cause of action lie and would have the judges 
 
who erects it.—Quod Anderson et Beaumond conesserunt. And 
they said, they had seen it to be enquired of before the Lord 
Dyer at the Assises as a nusance. And this case is not like to 
other cases which were put of nusances; for there the tort is by 
the party himself who doth it; but here the putting the conies 
into his own land is not any tort, and if there be any wrong it is 
by the conies themselves, who are ferae naturae; wherefore it is 
not reasonable to punish any other.  
Bowlston v. Hardy, 78 Eng. Rep. 794 (1596) (reported with a different 
spelling of Boulston). 
86. This assumes that such agreements would be enforceable, a question 
that would pose the same public policy issues as the question of whether 
competition should be fettered to encourage investment. The common-
law courts refused to enforce such an agreement in 1414 in Dyer’s Case, 
Y.B. 3 Hen. IV, fol. 5, Mich., pl. 26 (C.P.) (1414). See generally Harlan 
M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 
625, 635–37 (1960) (discussing the vague facts underlying Dyer’s Case 
and the decision). Under Coase’s analysis, such noncompete agreements 
should always be enforced by the courts because they reduce transaction 
costs. More recent cases show an increased willingness to enforce the 
agreements, but only to the extent that they are reasonable. See 
Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894] A.C. 
535 [Eng.]. Still, by frequently refusing to uphold restrictive covenants, 
courts reach results contrary to Coase’s economic analyses, just as in 
Hamlyn v. More and Boulston v. Hardy. Unlike Hamlyn v. More, the 
more recent decisions limiting enforcement are based on the notion that 
competition is almost always beneficial to the public, but courts 
recognize that in some instances other effects and purposes are sufficient 
to justify enforcing an agreement. 
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apply the ordinary law of nuisance, just as he would have in Boulston 
v. Hardy, so that the courts could decide whether a given competitive 
activity was inconsistent with the public interest.87 Applying the 
ordinary law of nuisance as Coase suggested, courts would use an 
economic balancing test. They would hold in many cases that 
competition is not a nuisance because the competitive harms imposed 
by the activity are an efficient result, but in some cases courts would 
find that the imposition of the competitive harms is inefficient.88 
While Hamlyn v. More is evidently the broadest limitation on the 
nuisance doctrine, it has received little discussion—even less than the 
narrower exception for wild animal nuisances in Boulston v. Hardy.89 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. briefly noted the exception and the 
privilege it creates: “a man has a right to set up a shop in a small 
village which can support but one of the kind, although he expects 
and intends to ruin a deserving widow who is established there 
already.”90 Holmes related that the exception “rests on the economic 
postulate that free competition is worth more to society than it 
costs.”91 But the law recognizes numerous exceptions to this oft-
 
87. Coase’s disagreement with Boulston v. Hardy is explicit, and it follows 
from this disagreement that his analysis also conflicts with Hamlyn v. 
More. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing Coase’s stated disagreement 
with Boulston v. Hardy). 
88. One potential set of cases where this could apply is in failed attempts at 
restrictive covenants in anchor arrangements. There is ongoing litigation 
in Florida over Dollar General stores that sell groceries in retail centers 
established around grocery store anchor tenants. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. 
v. Dolgencorp, Inc., 964 So. 2d 261 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). The 
court held that Dolgencorp had constructive notice of the 
noncompetition servitudes created by the anchor tenant lease, but the 
company is arguing on appeal that the notice was insufficient and does 
not bind the stores. As an alternative to the legal fiction of constructive 
notice, a court could hold that unreasonable competition with an anchor 
tenant is a nuisance. 
89. The Restatement (Second) of Torts does not mention competition in its 
nuisance sections. But see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 768 
(1979) (exempting competition from tort of interference with contractual 
and prospective contractual relationships). While popular property 
casebooks include Keeble v. Hickeringill, which cites Hamlyn v. More, 
they do not discuss the competitive harm exception in coverage of the 
nuisance cause of action. See, e.g., Jesse Dukeminier et al., 
Property 30–31, 729–62 (7th ed. 2010). The frequent omission of this 
vast exemption is surprising. But see Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 387, 
439–40 n.111 (1981) (discussing exception for pecuniary externalities). 
90. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1, 3 (1894). 
91. Id. 
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advanced laissez-faire position that competition is a public good.92 
And whatever the proper result, the failure of Coase’s economic 
analysis to explain this significant exception is troubling. 
2. Disagreeing with Boulston v. Hardy 
Coase disagreed with the holding in Boulston v. Hardy—that land 
users are never liable for harms to neighboring land when those harms 
flow through wild animals. Indeed, Coase spent four pages in The 
Problem of Social Cost challenging Pigou’s analysis of the rabbit 
nuisance problem.93 Pigou stated that a negative externality is 
“rendered to third parties when the game-preserving activities of one 
occupier involve the overrunning of a neighbouring occupier’s land by 
rabbits.”94 Accordingly, Pigou would have the game preserver always 
face liability. In The Problem of Social Cost, Coase argued that the 
absolute immunity from liability conferred in Boulston v. Hardy “is as 
undesirable, from an economic point of view” as Pigou’s preferred 
result of “fixing the rule at the other pole and making the harbourer 
of rabbits always liable.”95 Coase noted that “the ordinary law of 
nuisance would seem likely to give economically more satisfactory 
results than adopting a rigid rule.”96 Thus, Coase would have courts 
recognize a cause of action for wild animal nuisances, contrary to 
Boulston v. Hardy. Coase would have liability determined through an 
economic balancing that weighs social costs and benefits to determine 
the efficient result.97 
 
92. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power 
“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries”). While there has long been 
hostility toward enforcing anticompetitive restrictive covenants, 
especially in the context of employment contracts, some form of 
anticompetitive agreement is enforceable in every state. See supra note 
86 (reviewing restrictive covenant law). Noncompete agreements in 
anchor tenant arrangements play a crucial role in development deals. 
See supra note 88. 
93. Coase, supra note 1, at 35–39. 
94. Id. at 35 (quoting Pigou, supra note 46, at 185). 
95. Id. at 35–38. 
96. Id. at 38. 
97. To Coase’s credit, others have criticized the result in Boulston v. Hardy 
as well, on the grounds that it makes nuisance less rational. See id. at 
36 n.49 (citing Glanville L. Williams, Liability for Animals 
(1939)). For a description of Coase’s conception of the role of the court 
in balancing of costs and benefits in nuisance cases, see Smith, supra 
note 6, at 967. 
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IV. The Analysis’s Disagreement with Important 
Common Law Nuisance Exceptions Demonstrates  
Its Unsoundness and Suggests Its Incompleteness 
Social resources are scarce and, as a result, sufficient sympathy 
with the plight of potential plaintiffs and the perception of the 
capacity of legal solutions to make a difference are crucial aspects of 
the common law decisions. The flaw in Coase’s analysis lies in his 
failure to account for these two factors. In failing to account for 
sympathy by distinguishing between tragic and comic misfortune, 
Coase unsoundly advocates a result contrary to Hamlyn v. More. In 
failing to adequately account for capacity by distinguishing between 
parlor pigs and rascally rabbits, Coase unsoundly advocates 
intervention contrary to Boulston v. Hardy. 
A. Coase’s Analysis Unsoundly Ignores Sympathy 
1. Evocation of Sympathy: Tragedy v. Comedy 
Unhappiness and disappointment are a familiar part of life, albeit 
part of some lives more than others. Everyone can relate to the 
unhappy or the disappointed. Yet this is not enough for recognition of 
a cause of action to provide redress. The law—common law courts 
included—must recognize a specific plight affecting a potential class 
or group of people before it will be moved to action. Such action 
requires more than a mere understanding of the plight. Recognition 
requires sympathy. Sympathy, from its Greek roots syn (together) 
and pathos (passion), describes the phenomenon of concern for others 
reaching a level that may impel social action. But sympathy for the 
plight of a class of potential plaintiffs is not merely a function of the 
sum of the unhappiness and disappointment of its members. Often, 
the sufficiency of sympathy depends upon whether the circumstances 
of the plight are tragic or comic.  
The broad circumstances of the unhappiness or disappointment 
matter more than their magnitude in determining the social response. 
The common law courts reached results on whether a cause of action 
would lie according to broad descriptions of circumstances, as in 
Hamlyn v. More. The schoolmaster’s fortunes may or may not have 
been shattered, and the effect of competition on another 
schoolmaster’s fortune in a similar case may have been the opposite. 
But the individual plaintiff’s life did not determine the result—it was 
not even considered. As such, though courts will often recognize a 
cause of action in nuisance cases where the nuisance has relatively 
little negative impact on the life of the litigant, they always refuse to 
recognize a cause of action in competitive nuisance cases, 
notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs in some such cases suffer 
significant harm. Even under the metric of Coase, the rule that 
competition is never a nuisance will occasionally prevent the 
resolution of an economic inefficiency greater than inefficiency 
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unrelated to competition that may be resolved by the courts under 
nuisance law generally. In other words, while some noncompetitive 
nuisances pose smaller net social costs than some competitive 
nuisances, a cause of action for the competitive nuisance will not lie, 
even though a cause of action for the noncompetitive nuisance will. 
Though the common law courts recognized this, Coase failed to 
provide an adequate explanation for such results, focusing instead 
solely on net social costs. Unlike Coase, the common law courts 
addressed broad circumstances in deciding whether an action would 
lie independent of the particular facts of a case and the particular 
fortunes of the plaintiffs. 
Differences in the broad circumstances of a case, independent of 
the specific details of the plaintiff and defendant, determine whether a 
cause of action will lie because social concern for an individual plight 
requires sympathy. The individual plight must evoke feelings of 
concern that are more than personal; they must reach a social level in 
order to animate a social response. The individual plight must be 
neither too ordinary nor too special. The individual plight must flow 
from something common to the human experience, yet its occurrence 
must be rare enough to evoke special feelings in members of the 
community. 
One form of plight that consistently evokes sympathy is tragic 
misfortune caused by a failing of human nature. In particular, the 
failure of humans to foresee consequences of their actions is frequently 
depicted on stage and in literature. In a typical nuisance case, there is 
the essential element of tragedy—a mistake grounded in the frailties 
of human nature. The landowner, for example, fails to take 
precautions such as buying up surrounding land or purchasing land in 
a different place in order to prevent facing a future interference with 
the landowner’s use and enjoyment of the land. As most uses of 
adjacent land would not interfere, the risk of future interference is 
unlikely and unforeseeable. But the landowner may misjudge the 
prospects of future interference or fail to take precautions because the 
risk is low. If interference later arises, we nonetheless sympathize with 
the landowner’s plight caused by such unlikely and unforeseeable 
circumstances that the landowner reasonably failed to prevent. 
On the other hand, a form of plight that does not evoke 
sympathy, and instead evokes derision and ridicule, is comic 
misfortune caused by foolishness. In Der Zauberlehrling, Goethe tells 
the story of a sorcerer’s apprentice who causes a great mess by 
animating a broom to do his chores even though he is too unskilled to 
reverse the animation.98 Readers of the poem, and viewers of the Walt 
 
98. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Der Zauberlehrling, in Goethe’s 
Poems 90–94 (Martin Schütze ed., 1916). 
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Disney version,99 may understand and appreciate the young man’s 
plight, but do not sympathize with him because he famously brings 
the trouble on himself.100 Instead, he is laughed at, and the story is 
that of comic misfortune. 
Thus, if the circumstances of the plight of a potential class are 
tragic, a cause of action may be recognized. But if the circumstances 
of the plight are comic, the common law courts will likely refuse to 
recognize a cause of action. This is, of course, only one aspect of the 
common law decision-making process, but it is crucial to explaining 
cases like Hamlyn v. More that remain unexplained by the economic 
analysis offered by Coase. 
2. Insufficient Sympathy Explains Hamlyn v. More 
The most striking aspect of the decision in Hamlyn v. More—that 
the court reversed long-standing precedent to craft a seemingly 
arbitrary exception to the nuisance cause of action—is understandable 
in light of the events that created differences between sympathy for 
those facing economic competition and those facing other forms of 
nuisance. Facing economic competition was not a tragic misfortune in 
1410 because competition had become foreseeable and inevitable 
following the rise of the free laboring class.101 In fact, that economic 
 
99. Fantasia (Walt Disney Prods. 1940). 
100. The lines from the poem in which the apprentice pleads with his master 
for help yields a German cliché—Die Geister, die ich rief,  for foolishly 
bringing misfortune on one’s self: 
Ach, da kommt der Meister! Ah, here comes the master! 
Herr, die Not ist groß! I have need of Thee! 
Die ich rief, die Geister, From the spirits that I called 
Werd’ ich nun nicht los. Sir, deliver me. 
Goethe, supra note 98, at 94. 
101. For a recounting of the rise of the free laboring class, see Theodore F. 
T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 32–33 
(5th ed. 1956). Plucknett argues that the rise of economic actors 
unattached to a particular manor was in part a result of the population 
changes caused by the Black Death: 
[T]he arrival of the Black Death (1348–1349) from the East 
wrought a revolution in social and economic conditions. The 
terrible mortality from this plague completely disorganised the 
manorial system, which had hitherto depended upon a plentiful 
supply of labour born and bred within the manor. The plague 
accelerated and intensified forces which were already at work, 
and the result was a very serious depletion of the labour supply. 
The population of the manor was no longer sufficient to work 
the lord’s estates. Consequently lords began to compete among 
themselves for such free labour as was available. This tempted 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012 
Tragic Parlor Pigs and Comedic Rascally Rabbits 
584 
competition was formerly less foreseeable and likely before the rise of 
the free laboring class explains why the common law once recognized 
actions for competitive nuisances. When competition with a capital 
project was more random and less foreseeable, it was more similar to 
other cases of nuisance. But the predilections of the lord of the 
nearest manor no longer determined whether a capital operator faced 
competition once freeholds and wealth independent of the manor 
accumulated in England. Having lost the randomness and attendant 
unpredictability, the circumstances of the capital operator facing 
sudden competition lost the element of tragedy crucial to a social 
response in the form of continued recognition of a cause of action.  
Any prospective builder of a capital project who foolishly relied 
on the lack of competition would be a comic figure. When the 
schoolmaster in Hamlyn v. More is represented as having delivered 
schooling since time immemorial, the schoolmaster is represented as 
having relied on the lack of competition in making decisions regarding 
his practice.102 In two key parts of the report of the case, the court 
even belittled this reliance, as if to point out how ridiculous it is for 
anyone in 1410 to expect not to face competition.103 
As competition transformed from a tragic to a comic misfortune, 
the resulting loss of social concern explains the end of common law 
recognition of a cause of action for competitive harms and the 
decision to distinguish between competitive harms and other forms of 
nuisance. Yet social concern plays no role in Coase’s analysis. As a 
result, his economic analysis would support continued recognition of a 
cause of action for competitive nuisance, even though there is no 
generally felt concern for the plight of competitive-nuisance plaintiffs 
because their misfortune in facing competition is neither unlikely nor 
unforeseeable. 
 
servile inhabitants of manors to leave their holdings and become 
hired labourers. 
Id. at 32. Plucknett relates that this condition gave rise to yet another 
example of a common law limitation on competition: 
So keen was the competition that a series of ordinances and 
statutes beginning in 1349 regulated for the first time the 
relationships between master and servant, and provided 
machinery for the establishment of scales of wages above which 
any payment would be unlawful. 
Id. 
102. Baker & Milsom, supra note 61, 671–72. 
103. The court noted at the beginning of its opinion that, “[I[f I have a mill 
and my neighbour sets up another mill, so that the profit from my mill 
is reduced, I shall have no action against him; and yet he is damaging 
me.” Id. at 671 (emphasis added). The court repeated this principle 
again towards the end of the opinion. Id. at 672. 
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3. Insufficient Sympathy Explains Other Legal Decisions 
The importance of sympathy extends beyond competitive 
nuisance—other legal protections are withheld in less tragic cases 
while protection is afforded in more tragic cases.  
The provisions of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and 
in particular implied warranties of fitness, are interpreted as applying 
to the sale of goods, but not to mixed goods-services transactions.104 
One court noted that this creates a distinction that prevents plaintiffs 
from invoking Code protections for redress of “no less real but 
somehow less impelling economic loss[es].”105 The court justified this 
result by observing that the purpose of the protection is to deal with 
the impelling circumstance of “mass public reliance on [sellers’] 
products’ fitness and safety.”106 Therefore, “the code’s warranties 
attaching to sales of goods are underpinned by an assumption of some 
form of reasonable reliance by the unleveraged buyer.”107 
Coase would argue that the decision depends upon transaction 
costs resulting from the “unleveraged” position that prohibits buyers 
from negotiating with the mass producers of products. But the 
exception applies to the mass provision of mixed goods and services 
and to health care transactions in which clients and patients have just 
as little leverage as when they purchase wares from a store. For 
example, New York courts have held that Article 2 does not apply to 
transfusions of “‘bad’ blood, supplied by the hospital for a price as 
part of the customary services rendered by the hospital to its 
patients” because such transfusions are “part of, and incidental to, 
[the patient’s] medical treatment.”108 It is undeniable that patients 
have at least as little ability to negotiate with hospitals regarding 
 
104. See Milau Assocs., Inc. v. N. Ave. Dev. Corp., 368 N.E.2d 1247 (N.Y. 
1977) (holding that a sprinkler system installation is not covered under 
Article 2). The Code limits the application of Article 2 to “transactions 
in goods” without specifying whether mixed goods-services transactions 
are covered. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1977). Goods are defined as  
all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are 
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale 
other than the money in which the price is to be paid, 
investment securities (Article 8) and things in action. “Goods” 
also includes the unborn young of animals and growing crops 
and other identified things attached to realty as described in the 
section on goods to be severed from realty (Section 2-107). 
U.C.C. § 2-105(1). 
105. Milau, 368 N.E.2d. at 1251. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 1252. 
108. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792, 793, 796 (N.Y. 1954).  
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blood supply quality as customers have to negotiate with the 
manufacturer of retail goods regarding product safety, if not far less.109  
The difference between these cases and pure goods transactions is 
simply that the plight of the plaintiffs in the mixed goods-services 
cases is, as the court observed, less “impelling” than the plight of the 
plaintiff in a pure goods case.110 We usually purchase and consume 
conforming goods, just as land owners usually enjoy their land free 
from nuisance. Thus, like the plight of the land owner who suddenly 
faces interference with that enjoyment, the plight of the consumer 
who consumes a defective product is tragic.  
On the other hand, it is a common and frequent aspect of service 
transactions that the consumer is left dissatisfied. The result is that 
we are far less sympathetic to the plight of consumers of defective 
services. As an illustration, consider how frequently rat-in-the-yogurt-
cup stories make the news compared to how frequently botched car 
repair jobs make the news. We can relate to the frustrated car 
owners, but as common sufferers, and perhaps ironically, the public is 
less interested in providing redress when the results are more 
frequent. Accordingly, the sympathy that generated sufficient social 
concern for the recognition of the implied warranties in goods cases is 
lacking in mixed goods-services cases, and courts have refused to 
extend greater protection.  
Even the more liberal gravamen test reflects the importance of 
tragedy.111 The gravamen test treats goods sold as part of hybrid 
transactions as covered by Article 2 when the essence of the action is 
for the defectiveness of the good.112 By carving out those cases in 
which the plight is the direct result of the non-conformity of the good 
and this alone forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claim, courts provide 
legal remedies in the more tragic cases while continuing to deny legal 
remedies in less tragic cases. 
Insufficient sympathy also explains the special treatment afforded 
to the provision of medical goods and software. In the case of 
software, the experience of bugs in those goods is as frequent as the 
experience of non-conforming service. Thus, there is little social 
sympathy for the plight of the frustrated software user. In medical 
cases, no doctor or patient could reasonably believe that any form of 
medical treatment is without risks far higher in probability (as 
opposed to magnitude) than the probability of non-conforming goods. 
 
109. Many patients need blood transfusions because they have suffered a 
trauma requiring immediate surgical intervention. In such a state, 
patients do not usually even select the hospital that will provide care. 
110. Milau, 368 N.E.2d at 1251. 
111. Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 455 A.2d 434, 440 (Md. 1983). 
112. Id. 
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The cases determining whether farmers are merchants under 
Article 2 also may be more understandable on the basis of the nature 
of farm products. If farmers are merchants, the Code provides that 
their goods are impliedly merchantable.113 Courts have reached 
opposite conclusions on the issue of whether farmers’ annual crop 
sales are sufficiently regular to qualify farmers as merchants. 
Sometimes farmers are deemed merchants, and sometimes not.114 
Perhaps this difficulty stems from the failure to treat farmers of 
apples differently from farmers of corn. We are all wary of the rotten 
apple and the apple with the worm. Can the same be said for corn? 
Accordingly, in the case of apples, there may be less social sympathy 
for those visited by worms. But in the case of corn, there would be 
much sympathy for the plight of the consumer of a worm on the cob. 
Thus, the confusion may stem from treating dissimilar cases alike, 
creating a tension between the tragic and nontragic nonconformity of 
farm products. 
An opponent of expanding a cause of action aimed at redressing 
the plight of individuals, whether it be in tort or through the Code, 
can argue that the relatively higher frequency of the untoward result 
or the relatively greater foreseeability of the untoward result make its 
occurrence less tragic, thereby social concern is not as strong. More 
powerfully, an advocate in favor of extending a cause of action, 
whether in tort or through the Code, can argue for only limited 
advancement when going farther would be impossible by 
distinguishing between the relative tragedy in the case at hand and 
other seemingly similar cases. In resolving whether farm products are 
sold with an implied warranty of merchantability, an advocate against 
implying the warranty can argue that nonconformity in farm products 
is so much more likely than in other cases as to remove its occurrence 
from the realm of the tragic.115 An advocate of implying the warranty 
in a particular case can argue that the court need only recognize the 
 
113. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1977) (providing that unless an exclusion applies, “a 
warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract 
for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that 
kind”). The code defines a merchant as “a person who deals in goods of 
the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having 
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the 
transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by 
his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his 
occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.” U.C.C. 
§ 2-104(1). 
114. See Douglas J. Whaley, Problems and Materials on the Sale 
and Lease of Goods 29 (5th ed. 2008) (reviewing cases in various 
states involving various crops in which courts reach disparate results on 
the issue of whether farmers are merchants). 
115. This argument would also apply to software. 
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relatively more unlikely-to-not-conform farm products as impliedly 
merchantable.116 
B. Coase’s Analysis Unsoundly Misconstrues Capacity 
A nuisance is, as observed by Justice Sutherland, “like a pig in 
the parlor instead of the barnyard.”117 This clever turn of phrase 
reveals both the importance of capacity in the common law and how 
capacity is measured. Coase’s disagreement with Boulston v. Hardy 
stems from his economic analysis’s failure to appreciate capacity as an 
apparent and relative measure. 
1. Estimation of Capacity: Parlor Pigs v. Rascally Rabbits 
Coase argued that the capacity of government to achieve its 
objectives is crucial in determining whether government will or should 
act. He criticized Pigou for not considering the effectiveness of 
government when Pigou suggested intervention in all cases of a 
divergence between private and social costs.118 Coase suggested that 
the capacity of government to address a problem must accordingly be 
measured through an economic analysis that weighs the costs against 
the benefits of acting. He declared that no government should act if 
the benefits of acting, as measured by increases in net economic 
efficiency, do not outweigh the costs, as measured by losses in net 
efficiency.119 The weighing of costs against benefits is “above all” the 
“change in approach” that Coase advocated in The Problem of Social 
Cost.120 
Coase was correct in highlighting the importance of capacity, but 
he misconstrued its measure. It is true that, if it appears a 
government intervention either does not or will not sufficiently 
achieve the socially desired objective, the intervention will be 
abandoned or not undertaken at all. Accordingly, the capacity of a 
decision to achieve the socially desired objective must be estimated by 
the decision maker. But, in making this estimate, it is the appearance 
of capacity that matters. The common law courts were not 
omniscient. In some cases, the decisions brought about a new state of 
affairs, and the results could not have been predicted with certainty. 
 
116. This argument might apply to software, if some software is less likely to 
have bugs than other software. 
117. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). This 
appears to be an instance of the Supreme Court coining a phrase. 
118. As treated by Coase, and for the purposes of this Note, Pigou never 
considered the capacity of government to eliminate an identified 
externality. 
119. Coase, supra note 1, at 44. (“In devising and choosing between social 
arrangements we should have regard for the total effect.”). 
120. Id. 
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Even if a prior decision is attacked, it is not always certain what 
results a given decision caused and what results it did not. Therefore, 
courts have estimated and continue to estimate capacity based on the 
appearance of past or potential effects. 
Further, Coase treated every decision as binary—to implement or 
not to implement a proposed policy change—instead of appreciating 
the multiplicity of options. While he pointed out that government has 
at least three tools at its disposal—civil liability, taxation, and 
zoning—he offered no explanation of how to make a decision between 
civil liability and taxation if the benefits of both would exceed the 
cost.121 It is unreasonable to assume that in all cases there is only a 
single option producing benefits that outweigh its costs. Thus, the 
question is not only whether government should act, but how. Nearly 
every governmental decision is accordingly a choice among many 
possible actions, and advocating an approach in which governments 
engage only in profitable actions merely eliminates some possibilities 
while not distinguishing among the rest. If governmental resources are 
scarce, all profitable actions may not be possible, and the question 
becomes relative: What actions are relatively superior? 
Thus, recognition of a cause of action is not a simple question of 
whether the social benefits of recognition outweigh the costs—the 
question is whether recognition appears to be in the public interest 
relatively more than nonrecognition or other mechanisms of 
addressing the problem. As Boulston v. Hardy demonstrates, this is 
often a question of distinguishing between cases in which the judiciary 
 
121. Id. at 1–2 (recognizing that government has three options for dealing 
with the smoky factory situation—imposing liability for damage caused 
by the smoke, placing a tax on smoke production, or excluding the 
factory from residential areas). Recognizing the many possible methods 
of government action is a consistent blind spot for Coase. One of his 
later articles, The Lighthouse and Economics, can be read as a blistering 
parody of antigovernment theory because Coase failed to recognize 
governmental action when he describes it in detail. Ronald H. Coase, 
The Lighthouse and Economics, 17 J. L. & Econ. 357 (1974).  In the 
article, Coase made a great show of decrying the use of the lighthouse 
example to illustrate the need for government by outlining the history of 
the United Kingdom’s lighthouses as a counterexample. Some 
lighthouses were built and maintained by private parties. Id. at 363. 
Yet, in the article itself Coase related that these private parties were 
given permission by the government to unilaterally tax ships entering 
the nearby ports. Id. at 364. This would only contradict the use of the 
lighthouse as a demonstration of the need for government if the 
government were not acting when it acts through private parties by 
delegating the taxing and spending authority. While The Lighthouse and 
Economics does not prove its thesis or disprove the lighthouse example, 
it demonstrates that Coase is capable of writing for pages about 
government action while not recognizing that it is in fact government 
action. 
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perceived it had the capacity to provide redress and those in which it 
did not—that is, between parlor pigs and rascally rabbits. 
2. Perceived Incapacity Explains Boulston v. Hardy 
Ordinary nuisance appears easily remedied because the 
interference is localized and is the result of deliberate activity. The 
common law courts that recognized the modified assize of nuisance 
had at their disposal an easily administered and effective remedy in 
the form of the injunction. A common law court facing a plaintiff who 
complained of a defendant’s activity would perceive that it could 
provide redress by ordering the defendant to cease the activity, 
thereby taking the metaphorical pig out of the parlor. The reports of 
cases did not include summaries of what followed the decisions, so 
judges reviewing precedents would have no information regarding the 
permanency of the redress—that is, whether the pig stayed out of the 
parlor. But the common law courts had no reason to believe that the 
plaintiff would soon face interference from a different source because 
the interferences with quiet enjoyment were infrequent. A court 
considering a report would read, essentially, that there was once a pig 
in a parlor, then a court took the pig out of the parlor, and the 
plaintiff lived happily ever after.122 So long as the potential remedies 
in nuisance cases appeared easy and effective, courts were willing to 
recognize the cause of action. 
But eliminating wild animal interferences would not appear as 
easy to the common law courts as getting the pig out of the parlor—it 
would appear more like attempting to kill a rascally rabbit. 
Recognition of a cause of action was therefore perceived as incapable 
of achieving social objectives, or at least as relatively less capable 
than in other nuisance cases. Courts, legislators, and citizens prefer to 
see their government as a fireman rescuing a cat stuck in a tree rather 
than as Elmer Fudd futilely hunting Bugs Bunny. 
Whether the common law courts could have in fact eliminated the 
rascally rabbit because the problem was not as intractable as it 
appeared, the social perception of incapacity affected the common law 
decisions as much as, if not more than, actual incapacity. The court 
in Boulston v. Hardy decided not to recognize the cause of action 
because it perceived that a legal remedy could not achieve social 
objectives. Put another way, providing remedies for those harmed by 
wild-animal nuisances appeared to be a relatively inferior use of social 
resources. And by avoiding what appeared to be rascally rabbits and 
what would appear to be an inferior use of resources, whether or not 
 
122. Justice Sotomayor, on a recent episode of Sesame Street, handed down a 
decision in a dispute over a broken chair, Goldilocks v. Baby Bear, in a 
way that reflects the judicial perception of capacity: “I say you help 
Baby fix his chair, and then the two of you can live happily ever after.” 
Sesame Street: Rhyming Block (PBS television broadcast Jan. 25, 2012). 
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those problems were actually tractable, the courts maintained their 
credibility with the public. 
By focusing only on the actual and isolated capacity of a single 
“proposed policy change,”123 instead of the apparent and relative 
capacity of the many possible governmental responses to social 
concerns, Coase’s economic analysis unsoundly disagrees with 
Boulston v. Hardy by advocating the hunting of rascally rabbits.  
3. Perceived Incapacity Explains Other Legal Decisions 
 The consequences of perceived incapacity extend beyond Boulston 
v. Hardy and explain the disparate legal treatment of surface and 
subsurface resources. A cause of action for nuisance has lain for the 
diversion of a surface “water-course” since the inception of the 
nuisance action.124 As the court noted in Hamlyn v. More, if a 
“neighbor sets up a mill” and thereby “prevents the water from 
running to [a neighboring] mill, . . . [the neighboring miller] shall have 
such action [against him] as the law gives.”125 Yet, when nineteenth- 
and twentieth-century courts confronted diversions of subsurface 
fluids, they created an exception—just as in the case of Boulston v. 
Hardy and for the same reasons.126 Adjacent land owners have the 
same transaction cost problem as do the holder of an easement or 
profit and a concurrent user of the land discussed in Part II.C, and so 
recognition of a cause of action is justified by Coase’s economic 
analysis. But as the Supreme Court of Indiana summarized the rule in 
People’s Gas Co. v. Tyner, “if an adjoining land owner, in lawfully 
digging upon his own land, draws the water from the land of another, 
to his injury, such injury falls within the description of damnum 
absque injuria, which cannot become the ground of an action.”127 
Thus the so-called rule of capture is properly understood as one of 
several absolute exceptions to the nuisance action.  
The rule of capture applies not only to water but also to 
subsurface oil and natural gas reservoirs.128 The exception for 
 
123  Coase, supra note 1, at 43. 
124. BRACTON, supra note 38, f. 233. 
125. BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 61, at 672. 
126. People’s Gas Co. v. Tyner, 31 N.E. 59, 60 (Ind. 1892). 
127. Id. (citing New Albany & Salem R.R. Co. v. Peterson, 14 Ind. 112 
(1860) (citing Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1843)). 
128. See, e.g., People’s Gas Co., 31 N.E. 59 (natural gas); Kelly v. Ohio Oil 
Co., 49 N.E. 399, 401 (1897) (oil). In Kelly, the Ohio Supreme Court 
gave apt expression to the judicial feeling of incapacity: 
To drill an oil well near the line of one’s land cannot interfere 
with the legal rights of the owner of the adjoining lands, so long 
as all operations are confined to the lands upon which the well is 
drilled. Whatever gets into the well belongs to the owner of the 
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nuisances caused by extraction of subsurface resources from common 
pools was not adopted for a lack of sympathy with the adjacent land 
owner and not because of a policy in favor of extraction. Rather, the 
courts perceived their own incapacity to provide redress.  
The exemption is traceable to Acton v. Blundell, a case in which 
the court extensively discussed the issue of extending nuisance to 
interferences caused by activities that disturbed subsurface streams as 
opposed to surface streams.129 The court noted “that there is a marked 
and substantial difference between the two cases, and that they are not 
to be governed by the same rule of law.”130 The rule tending to preserve 
surface streams in their natural condition is supported by “the implied 
assent and agreement of the proprietors of the different lands from all 
ages,” whereas those purchasing land may be entirely unaware of 
subsurface streams and the restrictions such streams would impose 
upon mining or other activities if they could not be diverted.131 And the 
court listed the far more complicated circumstances and consequences 
of subterranean stream diversion: subterranean pools may be tapped 
and exhausted by drilling wells, it may be “entirely unsuspected” that a 
pool will be tapped causing otherwise harmless adjacent activities to 
become harmful and frustrating significant reliance and investment, 
and “there is no limit of space within which the claim of right to an 
underground spring can be confined.”132 
As all of these reasons cited by the court are implicated in any 
nuisance action, it is clear the court was apprehensive about dealing 
with these issues in the context of subterranean streams. The 
distinction, then, between the case of surface and subsurface 
disturbances is really the court’s feeling of judicial incapacity to 
 
well, no matter where it came from. In such cases the well and its 
contents belong to the owner or lessee of the land, and no one can 
tell to a certainty from whence the oil, gas, or water which enters 
the well came, and no legal right as to the same can be established 
or enforced by an adjoining landowner. The right to drill and 
produce oil on one’s own land is absolute, and cannot be 
supervised or controlled by a court or an adjoining landowner. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
129. Acton v. Blundell, (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Exch.); 12 M. & W. 324 
(Eng.). In the course of the case, Judge Addison framed the question to 
be decided by referencing Bracton and the holding of Hamlyn v. More. 
Id. at 1230; 12 M. & W. at 341 (Addison J.) (“There are many cases in 
which a man may lawfully use his own property so as to cause damage 
to his neighbour, so as it be not injuriosum. . . . He may build a mill 
near the mill of his neighbour to the grievous damage of the latter by 
loss of custom . . . .” (citing Bracton, supra note 38, f. 221)). 
130. Id. at 1233; 12 M. & W. at 349 (Tindal C.J.). 
131.  Id.; 12 M. & W. at 350. 
132. Id. at 1233–34; 12 M. & W. at 350–51. 
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provide redress. Faced with the prospect of a resource it could not see 
and activities with widespread effects, the court elected to eliminate 
the cause of action. The court in Acton v. Blundell and the courts 
that followed its holding did not necessarily reject the utility of the 
action, nor the fact that some plaintiffs might deserve relief. In 
essence, the court believed the problem of diversions of subterranean 
watercourses was a rascally rabbit, not a parlor pig.  
The subsequent statutory regulation of the drilling and pumping 
of oil and gas in the early twentieth century bore out the nineteenth-
century common law apprehension about judicial resolution of 
subterranean pool disputes. The early experience of states in the 
effects of the common law rule of capture on oil production led those 
involved to demand regulatory proration of drilling and pumping. By 
over-drilling fields in order to get as much oil from each find as fast as 
possible before depletion, oil producers depleted both reservoir energy 
and market prices for the oil, to their chagrin.133 The efforts of the 
producers to organize themselves failed.134 With neither a common law 
nor private solution, the producers turned to state legislators, 
governors, and even the President of the United States.135 When 
legislators and government executives heeded the call to regulate a 
field the judiciary had long ago abandoned, the response can only be 
described as open rebellion. Producers shirked proration orders, 
pumping oil at night to avoid detection. Efforts to quell black-market 
production and distribution of this illegally pumped “hot oil” had 
limited effect.136 Martial law was declared. Troops were called into the 
oil fields. It may be debatable whether courts deciding common law 
cases might have fared better had they tried to intervene. But 
certainly they perceived that the very nature of disruption of 
subterranean fluid resources put these disputes beyond the capacity of 
the common law courts.137 
 
133. Gerald D. Nash, United States Oil Policy 1890–1964, at 120 
(1968); Bryan Burrough, The Big Rich 76 (2009). Depletion of 
reservoir energy through overdrilling can waste the entire pool by 
preventing extraction, since oil drillers rely on subterranean pressure to 
“pump” the substance to the surface. 
134. See Nash, supra note 133, at 122 (“At first, in 1926, they agreed on a 
voluntary prorationing program to balance production with available 
demand. As in the case of so many of these voluntary agreements, 
however, in 1927 a minority of violators disrupted the entire industry.”).  
135. Burrough, supra note 133 at 76–78.  
136. Id. at 78. 
137. Following the height of the proration crisis and advancements in 
understanding oil and gas pools, courts subsequently reinstated a form 
of the nuisance action for “waste” of a common pool resource. Elliff v. 
Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948). 
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C. Coase’s Analysis May Also Be Incomplete 
That Coase’s economic analysis disagrees with important common 
law decisions suggests it may not only be unsound, but it may also be 
incomplete. Coase’s analysis is unsound because the existence of both 
externalities and prohibitive transaction costs are not sufficient 
conditions for common law recognition of a cause of action, as 
evidenced by the exceptions announced in Hamlyn v. More and 
Boulston v. Hardy. As this is caused by Coase’s analytical failure to 
account for sympathy and capacity, it appears that his analysis is also 
incomplete—that is, it yields false negatives. Externalities and 
transaction costs are not necessary conditions of government action 
because sufficient sympathy or the perception of capacity are 
sufficient for government action in some cases. 
1. Sufficient Sympathy May Explain Other Legal Decisions 
Coase does not recognize any connection between the degree of 
social concern and the social willingness to bear inefficiency in an 
attempt to meet that concern. That there are some instances in which 
the common law decided not to recognize a cause of action because of 
insufficient sympathy suggests that governments might also act on 
the basis of sufficient sympathy alone. And sympathy is just one 
source of public concern. Contrary to Coase’s economic analysis, 
governments may act without benefiting the public or increasing 
efficiency, so long as there is sufficient social concern that something 
is done. Understanding the actions of representative government 
requires at least some degree of acceptance of vox populi, vox dei.138 So 
long as the social concern is legitimate, such as sympathy for the 
plight of potential plaintiffs, these fruitless social responses cannot be 
questioned on economic grounds. 
Just as in medicine, there is a distinction between a government 
action’s effectiveness in addressing a problem and a government 
action’s effectiveness in salving the spirit of the public. The art of 
medicine is far older than its utility—there has always been healing, 
but there has not always been curing.139 Indeed, “[t]he first cry of pain 
through the primitive jungle was the first call for a physician.”140 
Medicine was “conceived in sympathy” as a response to those crying 
out in distress.141 Those who responded could do nothing to cure the 
medical problem, but they performed the important task of making 
 
138. The voice of the people, the voice of god. 
139. Eric J. Cassell, The Healer’s Art 52 (1976). 
140. Victor Robinson, The Story of Medicine 1 (1931). 
141. Id. 
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the sick feel better. They offered healing.142 In the nineteenth century, 
modern medicine gave the healers the power to actually prevent and 
cure disease.143 Equipped with this power, doctors offered healing and 
curing. Even today, large sums of money are spent on remedies that 
have no effect.144 These remedies offer healing without curing. It 
cannot be said that the expenditure of personal resources on such 
fruitless endeavors is wrong in and of itself. 
In the same way, if a society has a sufficiently large social 
concern, it may and often does elect a social response that is totally 
incapable of meeting that concern. Consider training civilians to 
“duck and cover” in case of a nuclear attack. Given a significant 
enough concern, it is as foolish and unhelpful to say that government 
should do nothing at all if it will not meet that concern as it would be 
to tell a terminally ill patient to stop taking herbal remedies because 
they will not save the patient’s life. If the majority of individuals in a 
society desire to aid the poor or the unemployed out of sympathy 
with their plight, their government is well within its rights to expend 
resources, even futilely. Incapacity itself is no argument in the face of 
a large and deeply felt concern. There are only two appropriate 
responses to these fruitless actions—an assessment that the means or 
ends are illegitimate or that there are superior uses of public resources 
in meeting public concerns. To respond that they are inefficient when 
analyzed economically is inappropriate. 
 
142. See Cassell, supra note 139, at 52 (emphasizing the difference between 
curing and healing). 
143. Jakob Henle described the state of medicine at the time he led the 
charge for the institutional development of modern medicine:  
The physician must diagnose the nature of the disease, and after 
that, define in particular, those external influences which may 
become remedies. It has been a subject of long controversy to 
determine what law should guide him in this labor. . . . But 
incontestable and undisputed remedial prescriptions belong to 
the rarities. With a material of experience collected during two 
thousand years, we still see the leaders . . . of the art despairing 
of all influence of medicines, and others in homogenous cases 
taking diametrically opposite ways. After two thousand years of 
instruction, the Medical Profession has not yet acquired so 
strong a hold that every self-conceited charlatan cannot, for a 
time at least, figure as a reformer. 
Jakob Henle, A Treatise on General Pathology 17, 20. (Henry 
C. Preston trans., 1853). Henle’s student Robert Koch would later 
independently develop the germ theory of disease. 
144. “I’m sorry if you’re into homeopathy. It’s water.” Dara O’Briain 
Talks Funny: Live in London (Universal Pictures UK 2008). 
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2. Perceived Capacity May Explain Other Legal Decisions 
Coase argued that the existence of a market solution means the 
government should not get involved. Yet his analysis purports to 
examine each proposed policy change in isolation. This assumes that 
the capacity of government to implement one policy is independent of 
its decision to implement or not implement another policy. The 
history of the common law illustrates that, by handling enough parlor 
pigs, whether or not it was needed, the common law grew in power to 
an extent that it could handle formerly intractable problems.  
Perhaps surprisingly to Coase, it would have been unthinkable in 
twelfth-century London to expect that any civil body would enforce 
promissory agreements between neighbors not associated with a 
conveyance of land. The law of contracts for consideration developed 
far later than Coase’s analysis would suggest. And its development 
was preceded by the development of the judiciary and other 
departments of government through the handling of many other 
problems—many of which Coase’s analysis might suggest were 
unnecessary because they could have been handled by the market or 
the firm.145 By not simply avoiding recognition of causes of action 
whenever the market could handle the problem, the common law grew 
into a more powerful tool of social coordination. Thus Coase is wrong 
to argue that it is foolish for the government to handle problems that 
the market can handle. Whether by operating post offices and 
lighthouses, or by resolving conflicts among neighbors, or by acting 
merely because government can—and not because government must 
due to market failure—governments feed on parlor pigs and grow 
strong enough to tackle rascally rabbits. 
Conclusion: The Value of Unsound  
and Incomplete Analysis 
Coase’s economic analysis of the common law, arguing that 
common law courts and governments act to solve problems if and 
only if there are both externalities and sufficient transaction costs, is 
unsound and incomplete. The existence of both externalities and 
prohibitive transaction costs is neither a sufficient nor a necessary 
condition for government action. What, then, is the theory worth? 
What is a vending machine worth if it accepts counterfeit and rejects 
genuine notes?  
 
145. See Coase, supra note 121 (disputing the traditional economic belief 
that government should operate lighthouses). Coase’s arguments are 
based upon a strange failure to appreciate that a government acts when 
it gives a private party the right to impose taxes on other private 
parties. See discussion supra note 121. 
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Coase’s work is venerable and has formed a pillar of the law and 
economics movement, providing much enjoyment and stimulation to 
its adherents these past fifty years. But a theory of government that 
is neither sound nor complete is a broken theory and must be 
rejected. Some would argue that it is worth modifying Coase’s 
economic analysis in order to maintain its place in legal scholarship. 
They would argue that it is better to update Coase’s analysis to 
account for the competitive nuisance exception and to excise or 
forgive Coase’s explicit rejection of the wild animal nuisance 
exception. But that would still leave the problem of the analysis’s 
failure to justify inefficient yet legitimate government action and 
Coase’s staunch position that government should never act needlessly, 
regardless of the effect of action on its power to handle other 
problems. However attractive it may be to save Coase by fixing his 
economic analysis for him, it is not worth the trouble. Consider the 
following parable by Jakob Henle: 
A pedant for a long time had a nightingale, which gladdened 
him with its song. The animal died. The pedant, finding quiet 
and solitude disagreeable, went out to buy another bird. But 
there were only a few nests brought to market. The merchant 
knew not certainly that the eggs were fructified, and, at all 
events, would not warrant them to produce males; even when 
hatched, they would require considerable attention and training 
before they would become singers. To the pedant this appeared 
hazardous; and he went home, saying he would rather keep his 
dead nightingale. This was acting conservatively; but was it 
judicious? That the trouble of training the young brood might 
be lost, was possible; but that the dead nightingale would never 
sing—was certain.146 
Coase’s unsound and incomplete economic analysis of the common 
law is a dead nightingale. 
Robert D. Cheren † 
 
146. HENLE, supra note 143, at xiv–xv. 
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